Freedom from self-reference
The Queue paradox is not due to self-reference. Although (Q) contains the indexicals "me" and "now", it could be reformulated with eternal sentences. Just have student n think "There is a student at a position greater than n who is thinking an untruth at 3.35 p.m. on February 25, 1997". This gives each student his own sentence type to think about. No student is thinking (even inadvertently) about his own thoughts. Indeed, one can orchestrate the puzzle so that the domain of discourse for the existential quantifier does not include the thinker himself. This guarantees that there is no indirect self-reference.
Differences in the objects of thought can be multiplied indefinitely by adding disjuncts to (Q). Adding contradictions will suffice. For example, student n could be assigned "There is a student at a position greater than n who is thinking an untruth at 3.35 p.m. on February 25, 1997 or n is greater than n". Further variety could be introduced by adding long strings of contingent disjuncts that are jointly inconsistent.
Worried that the first disjunct is doing all the work? No problem. Just switch to a more complex sentence that is equivalent to (Q), such as (R) Some of the even numbered students behind me are thinking an untruth or some of the odd numbered students behind me are thinking an untruth. Each student in the queue might spontaneously think of a different sentence that is truth-functionally equivalent to (Q).
Those with a mereological conception of self-reference might be alarmed by a part (a student) referring to its whole (the queue). This concern can be side-stepped by making each student an outsider. Instead of placing each student inside a single comprehensive queue, let each student restrict his attention to the queue composed of all and only those students behind him. Thus student n will refer to the queue that begins with student n + 1: "Some member of the queue behind me is thinking an untruth". Since student n is not a member of this queue, he is no longer referring to a whole of which he is a part.
The Queue's lineage
The Queue is inspired by three paradoxes. The first was posed by Prior (1961, p. 30) . Mr. X thinks Mr. Y is an idiot. They are walking along a corridor and separate shortly before 6 p.m. Mr. X thinks his companion has retired to room 7, and that he himself has retired to 6. But actually, Y is in room 8 and X is in room 7. X thinks one thought at 6 p.m.: Nothing thought in room 7 at 6 p.m. is true. Is Mr. X's thought true?
The Queue also owes something to Makinson's (1965) Preface paradox. An author apologizes in the preface for errors that are bound to exist in the text. This is rationally permissible. Yet the author thereby ensures that his beliefs cannot be jointly true. Thus we appear to have an example of rational but inconsistent beliefs.
In a variation known as the Sophisticated Preface paradox, the preface belief includes itself in its own domain of discourse; instead of apologiz-ing for the errors in the text, the author apologizes for the errors in the whole book (which includes the preface). We further suppose that all of the beliefs expressed in the text turn out to be true. If the belief in the preface is true, it is false. But if false, then it accurately reports an error. The Sophisticated Preface paradox is generally dismissed as a variation of the liar paradox. Aside from the element of belief, it is just like the indirect liar featuring a list containing nothing but truths plus the statement "Some of the statements on this list are not true".
The Liar paradox is commonly associated with self-reference. But Yablo has shown how the liar can be constructed without self-referencequietly in " Truth and Reflection" (1985, p. 340) , colourfully in "Paradox without Self-reference" (1993) . (Also see Visser 1989 , Sc. 3.2.2, Gaifman 1988 , and Burge's infinite truth teller (1981 .) The technique substitutes the cramped circularity of self-reference with the luxuriant linearity of an infinite series. In particular, suppose there is a denumerable sequence of sentences:
(Y1) For all k greater than 1, Yk is not true (Y2) For all k greater than 2, Yk is not true … (Yn) For k greater than n, Yk is not true … If (Yn) is true, then all of its subsequent sentences are untrue. But then each sentence after (Yn) accurately reports that all of its subsequent sentences are untrue, hence each should be true. If (Yn) is untrue, then one of the subsequent sentences must be true. However, if this subsequent sentence is true, all of its subsequent sentences are untrue. But then, as previously noted, each of its subsequent sentences would accurately report that their subsequent sentences are untrue-making them true after all.
Yablo's paradox has no covert self-reference. A search for his liar in Smullyan's encyclopedic work (1994) will be in vain. Self-reference is one way to achieve the ungroundedness essential to the liar paradox. But Yablo's paradox achieves ungroundedness by exploiting an alternative pattern of semantic dependency.
The pattern blindsides standard hierarchial approaches to the liar. Tarski (1949) tries to block the liar by treating "true" as an incomplete expression (as "true in language L") that can only be applied from a metalanguage to one of its object languages. Self-referential attributions of truth or falsehood violate this restriction, so the classic liar is banned as an ill-formed formula. However, Forster (1997) points out that Yablo's liar can be modified to conform with Tarski's restriction. We need only go "backwards" along the negative integers, ensuring that each statement be a meta-statement that only uses a lower level truth-predicate: 0. No statement below is true at level -1, -1. No statement below is true at level -2, -2. No statement below is true at level -3, etc.
If statement 0 is true 0 , then statement -1 is not true -1 . But -1 would only be saying what is accurate-that none of its predecessors is true -2 . (By "predecessor" I mean a member with a numerically larger index, for instance, -7 is a predecessor of -3.) Hence -1 would be true -1 . If statement 0 is not true 0 , then one of its predecessors, -n, would be true -n . But then it would be the predicament just canvassed. In particular, it would imply that its predecessor is not true-n-1 even though its predecessor says only what is accurate.
Significance of the Queue
Inconsistent beliefs in the Preface paradox are inevitable and personal. Inconsistency in the Queue is contingent and impersonal. The Queue paradox is about belief in the fallibility of others. Believing that others have false beliefs does not make you inconsistent. So unlike the Preface paradox, the Queue is not driven by a concern for the internal consistency of a particular agent. The inconsistency is a public problem.
This side-steps solutions to the Preface paradox that appeal to a distinction between acceptance and belief. Acceptance is a commitment to defend a proposition as part of a comprehensive view (Cohen 1992) . Inquiry is served by this stance because alternative theories get systematic elaboration. Thus one can accept a theory even if one believes it probably contains some falsehoods.
The belief/acceptance distinction does not get a foothold in the Queue paradox. Each member of the queue can be internally consistent. Acceptance of the fallibility of others does not preclude all of one's beliefs from coming out true.
The Sophisticated Preface paradox raised the question of whether belief in your own fallibility is infallible. If I believe that I have some false beliefs, then it seems I must have some false beliefs. But the Queue does not raise the issue of incorrigibility because it does not involve introspective assessment. Each member of the queue adopts an external perspective on the beliefs of others, not his own beliefs. In Prior's paradox, Mr. X also intends to be adopting this external perspective. However, Mr. X inadvertently winds up as a self-evaluator through a mistake about himself (i.e. his false belief about who is in room 7). This prompts the idea that the problem can be traced to a difficulty about representing one's own beliefs. This invites assimilation to Gödel's incompleteness theorem, concern with indexicals, and the general self/ other asymmetry.
Happily, Prior's solution is severe enough to avoid these distractions. His (albeit reluctant) suggestion is that his puzzle can be solved by placing external limits on what can be thought. Although Mr. X appears to be thinking … we must just accept the fact that thinking, fearing, etc., because they are attitudes in which we put ourselves in relation to the real world, must from time to time be oddly blocked by factors in that world, and we must just let Logic teach us where these blockages will be encountered. (Prior 1961, p. 32) The postulation of unthinkables is more radical than the externalism about thought championed by recent externalists. They only defend the thesis that what you think is affected by external factors, not whether you think. The prominent externalist Burge has commented extensively on Prior's puzzle. Burge (1984) tries to give Mr. X something to think about by distinguishing between indices of thought. There would be a contradiction in granting that Mr. X thought 0 in room 7 that there are no thoughts 0 in room 7. But thinking inherits the indexicality of "true", so Burge can save the appearance of mentation by describing Mr. X as having correctly thought 1 that there are no thoughts 0 in room 7.
Although writing long before Burge's proposal, Prior did consider solutions that appeal to levels. He characterizes the "Ramifiers" as maintaining that there is no such thing as a plain fact, but only first-order facts, second-order facts, and so on; that the fact that no first-order fact is being assented to in Room 7 is itself not a first-order but a second order fact; and that the fact that no fact of any order is being assented to in Room 7 is not and cannot be assented to by anyone at all, even in Room 9, because there is not and cannot be any such fact. This would be to dispose of an argument for certain restrictions on what is allowed to be sayable, thinkable, etc., by admitting both these and countless other restrictions by another door; not, it seems to me, the shrewdest of bargains. One can admit, however, that it is when he is "order-jumping" (or at least when someone in his neighborhood is doing so) that the world's best introspector is liable to find himself deceived. (Prior 1961, p. 32) The Queue reinforces Prior's skepticism about levels. The levels approach is modeled on the natural numbers. There is a base level and then a denumerable number of successive levels. The Queue paradox can deprive a levels approach of its base level by having the queue extend infinitely in both directions like the set of negative and positive integers. The Queue can deprive the levels approach of unique successive levels by raising the order of infinity to the super-denumerable. If the number of students corresponds to the real numbers, then there will always be a student between any two other students. (A dense ordering of physical students might be impossible, but our students could be souls or monads-thinking points on the real number line.) Then "the next student's level of thought" will be an empty description.
Can one adapt the levels approach to model a super-denumerable queue? One would need a super-denumerable number of distinct languages. Truth would be, emphatically, truth-in-a-language. Since these different concepts of truth cannot be defined in any particular language, they are, in effect, a super-denumerable stock of primitive terms. Thus they cannot be learned by finite beings such as ourselves.
Burge scales down the hyper-ambiguity of the levels approach by characterizing truth as indexical. If "true" is like "here" or "now", it has a single meaning an yet its extension automatically shifts from context to context. This permits Burge to distinguish between the meaning of two tokens of the same sentence type:
is not true 0 because of its circularity. It is neither true 0 nor false 0 . Given this truth-value gap, it is true 1 to say that (L) is not true 0 . So (L′) is true 1 . Hence, we can consistently say (L) itself is both true 1 and not true 0 . And we can say it within a single language.
Robert Koons (1992) offers a detailed algorithm for extending this context sensitive approach to descending negative chains such as:
(1) Sentence (2) is not true, (2) Sentence (3) is not true, etc. Each sentence lacks a truth 0 value (this time because of the infinite dangling rather than circularity) and so is not true 0 . Yet this truth 0 -value gap makes each sentence an accurate informant of its neighbor's untruth 0 . Hence, each sentence is also true 1 .
This context sensitive approach is designed to work within a single, learnable language-such as English. However, such a language has only denumerably many sentences. Supplementing the language with indices might ensure that there will be a sentence for any thought in the superdenumerable queue. But the language will not have a sentence for each and every thought in the queue. For there are uncountably many thoughts and only countably many sentences. At most, a denumerable language can describe the thoughts in general terms-as I have done in this paper. Indexical sentence tokens only acquire indices when actually uttered. If there are super-denumerably many sentence tokens and each is uttered in a denumerable language, then there must be more than one language. Indeed, there must be super-denumerably many of these denumerable languages. Hence, the context sensitive approach cannot achieve its goal of solving the liar from within a single language.
Must a liar be computable?
One might object that the problems of ungrounded infinities are distinct from those posed by the liar. For example, Hardy (1995) has questioned whether Yablo's paradox really is a liar paradox. Unlike familiar liars, Yablo's paradox involves an infinite collection of sentences. No finite sequence of Yablo sentences is paradoxical. So unlike familiar versions of the liar paradox, there is no first order derivation of a contradiction. (Tennant (1995) has proposed a finitary derivation but it is not in normal form.) A formal proof would require infinitely many instances of the Tarski biconditionals. These instances would only be omega-inconsistent: no finite conjunction of Yablo sentences is inconsistent.
This apparent disanalogy can be weakened by the construction of a standard liar that is only omega-inconsistent. We build from a familiar indirect liar paradox:
1. There is a falsehood on this list. 2. 2 = 2. Here one tautology must be checked to get the contradiction. Now consider the sequence of indirect liars obtained from adding "3 = 3", then "4 = 4", and so on. These larger and larger finite liars allow one to smoothly generalize to an infinite liar that contains an endless list of members of the form "n = n". To get the contradiction that the first statement is true if, and only if it is not true, I need to show that the successors of the first statement are all true. Thus this infinite liar requires an omega-rule just as much as Yablo's paradox.
The infinite, indirect liar is a bridge to Yablo's paradox because of the infinite, indirect liar's essential use of self-reference. I have kept the paradox simple (using falsehood instead of untruth, keeping the indexical "this" instead of using an eternal sentence). This simplicity highlights the resemblance to the simple liar, "This is false", and invites the invention of new infinite liars along lines familiar from the finite liars (empirical liars, modal liars, etc.).
Infinite liars can take the form of a single sentence rather than a sequence (D∞) Either this first disjunct is false or this second disjunct is false or … .
The reasoning for a finite disjunctive liar can be illustrated with:
(D2) Either this first disjunct is false or this second disjunct is false.
If (D2) is true, then one of its disjuncts is true. If the first disjunct is true, it is false, hence the second disjunct would be true. But if the second disjunct is true, then the second disjunct is false. Yet if both disjuncts are false, the disjunction as a whole is false. On the other hand, if both disjuncts are false, both report things as they are, so both are true. The same reasoning holds for any finite disjunctive liar. When the disjunction is infinite, the reasoning requires the omega rule. Once again, the reliance on the omega rule does not impugn the liar-hood of (D∞). The resemblance to the standard liar can be further accentuated by eliminating the ordinal references of (D∞) in favour of "Either this disjunct false or this disjunct is false or …". The classic liar can be considered a degenerate case of a disjunctive liar (where there is only one disjunct). Disjoining a liar with a liar yields a liar. Therefore, disjoining a liar with a liar infinitely many times still yields a liar.
The Yablo liar also has a disjunctive variation: "All of the subsequent disjuncts are false or all of the subsequent disjuncts are false or …". The first disjunct is true only if all of the subsequent disjuncts are false. But there can only be a false successor if some further disjunct were true. And that would be a counterexample to the first disjunct. On the other hand, if the first disjunct is false then it has a true successor. But the previous reasoning shows that no member of the sequence can be true. Hence, the infinite, disjunctive self-referential liar can be neatly compared with a Yabloesque counterpart.
These infinite, self-referential liars also cushion Yablo's liar against Priest's (1997) criticisms. Priest argues that Yablo's paradox has the same structure as other self-referential paradoxes, in particular, it conforms to the taxonomy presented by Priest (1995) . This structural conclusion is based on the premise that Yablo's specification of his sequence makes indispensable use of self-reference.
As a finite thinker, Yablo can only generate his infinite sequence with a quantified expression of the form (Yn) For all k greater than n, Yk is not true.
The need for this proposition is disguised by casual presentations that merely list the first few members and then recourse to a vague "etc.", "and so on", or "…". This explicit (Yn) formulation is self-referential in the sense that (Yn) uses its own location in the sequence as a reference point to specify which statements are not true i.e. the statements after (Yn).
Priest stokes the suspicion that this is a relevant sense of "self-reference" by casting the point as a fixed point theorem.
If there were only finitely many statements, we could exhaustively enumerate each statement and so would have no need of a description of the sequence. But since we are dealing with an infinite sequence, Priest concludes that the formula is essential. Thus, Yablo faces a "revenge" problem: the very effort to push self-reference out the front door is sustained by self-reference from the back door.
Priest's objection underestimates the resources available to those who wish to specify sequences. An infinite being could enumerate a denumerable list of sentences. For example, God could write the first sentence during the first minute, the second sentence after following 30 seconds, the third in the following 15 seconds, and so on. By writing faster and faster, God could finish the sequence in two minutes. Since we finite beings know that the Yablo sequence is paradoxical for the infinite being, we know that the Yablo sequence is paradoxical simpliciter. Our use of a selfreferential specification is merely a useful heuristic.
Sequences can be specified demonstratively instead of descriptively. A methodologically scrupulous experimenter selects his random number sequence by randomly flipping to a page of the Rand Corporation's classic A Million Random Digits. If I see a queue of students, I can specify a sequence just by pointing at the queue-even if the queue is infinitely long. God need not have set up the queue. No one need be able to construct a roster. If a finite being wishes to describe which sequence is my demonstratum, then his description must be recursive and so self-referential in a sense. But the finite being's self-referential description of the demonstratum fails to make any component of the original demonstration (demonstrator, act of demonstration, demonstratum) self-referential.
There are infinitely many Yablo sequences that lack finite generating functions. Consider a sequence in which each odd sentence states that all of its odd successors are false. Let the even numbered sentences be random junk of the form "n is a prime number" where n is a random integer. Inserting random junk thwarts recursive specification of the whole sequence. Since an infinite random sequence requires an infinitely long description, infinite random sequences are too complex even for "self-referential" descriptions. No finite description of an infinite random sequence can be complete.
Our junked up illustration shows that there are pre-junked Yablo sequences. They are mathematical objects existing independently of our mischief. And there are infinitely many of them. In some, only every third sentence is a working Yablo sentence (saying every third successor is false). In others, only every fourth sentence is a worker. The junk sand-wiched between the workers can be indefinitely thick. The workers can themselves be dispersed in a random pattern. Worse, the workers can share parts of their jobs amongst many other sentences, thereby blurring the distinction between worker sentence and junk sentence. The only way to verify that such a sequence of sentences is a Yablo liar paradox is through an infinite inspection. The devil is in the details.
There are infinitely many Yablo paradoxes that cannot be specified by any recursive formula. Since no finite being can specify such a sequence, no finite being can verify the paradoxicality of such a sequence. But we can know an existential generalization (namely, that there are random Yablo sequences) without applying the inference rule of existential generalization to a known specimen.
What lies beyond our complexity horizon
The anti-recursive effects of infinite randomization can be approximated with finite random sequences. Imagine a telephone conversation in which you are instructing a typist to print some fifty digit sequences that only you can see:
1. 11111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111 2. 01011010110101101011011010101101011010110101101101 3. 10001011011011000101011001110001010001001111100100 The information in sequence 1 can be compressed into "Print 1 fifty times". Sequence 2 can be compressed into the longer instruction "Print 01011 ten times." However, the information in sequence 3 (which was obtained from tossing a coin) cannot be compressed. Random sequences have no pattern. Since you can only list the members of the sequence, your description will be about as long as the sequence itself.
The more complex, the harder to compress. This suggests that the complexity of a sequence can be measured by the length of its shortest description. This length varies with our descriptive resources, so we need to standardize. Happily, there is already a convention devised independently by Chaitin and Kolmogorov: the (algorithmic) complexity of a finite sequence of 0's and 1's is the length of the shortest computer program that will print out the sequence. (Actually, further standardization is needed because the program length varies with the programming language and the computer. These concerns are addressed by Solomonoff (1964) .)
The randomness of a sequence can be measured as a ratio of shortest program length to string length. This ratio tends to unity for the majority of sequences. Although it is provable that most sequences are therefore random, one cannot prove that a particular sequence is random. For one cannot prove that there is no shorter program.
The Chaitin-Kolmogorov definition of complexity resembles the definite description that drives the Berry paradox: "the least integer not nameable in fewer than nineteen syllables". This phrase seems to denote an integer, in particular, 111,777. Yet the Berry definite description is itself only eighteen syllables long and so is shorter than the nineteen syllable numeric phrase that appears to denote 111,777. The Berry phrase denoting 111,777 cannot be shorter than the shortest phrase denoting 111,777. Hence, there is no such thing as a denoting Berry phrase. Chaitin (1970) develops the resemblance between his definition of "complexity" and the Berry phrase into a proof of the following theorem: no computer can produce a sequence which is more complex than the computer itself. The complexity of the computer equals the length of the shortest description of its operation. Code that description as a sequence, C, of 0s and 1s. If the computer could generate a more complex sequence S, then there would be a program that generates S which is shorter than the shortest program that can generate S, namely, the program coded by C. So S does not exist. It also follows that the computer's output cannot be any more random than itself.
Chaitin is well aware of the resemblance between his adaptation of Berry's paradox and adaptations of the liar paradox by Gödel and Turing. For Chaitin (1986), Gödel's incompleteness theorem and Turing's halting problem are just two sides of the same random coin.
Chaitin's theorem applies to any human artifact-or human. There are finite random sequences that are beyond each individual's complexity horizon. Splicing such a sequence into a Yablo sequence yields an indescribable Yablo liar. A sufficiently large, finite random sequence will overwhelm any physically possible thinker.
If we put aside physical limitations, then finite random junk will not yield a universally indescribable Yablo liar. For each finite thinker, there will be a Yablo liar that he cannot describe (indeed, infinitely many). However, there will also be a more powerful finite thinker, who can run through that amount of junk by brute enumeration. Although every thinker is overwhelmed by some Yablo liar, no (finitely randomized) Yablo liar overwhelms all possible finite thinkers.
To obtain a universally indescribable Yablo sequence, one must splice in an infinite random sequence. "Universal" here encompasses only finite thinkers. We can widen the domain to any order of infinite being by using higher order randomization. Cantor's diagonal argument suggests that there is an infinite hierarchy of possible infinite beings. At the bottom are those that can only solve a super-task of size ℵ-0 (i.e. a task that involves a number of acts equal to the cardinality of the set of the natural numbers). Given the continuum hypothesis, the next super-task has a size of ℵ-1 (i.e. a number of acts equal to the cardinality of the power set of the previous set). An ℵ-n infinite being cannot solve a problem that is a super-task of level ℵ-n+1. So there will be a Yablo liar that is indescribable to an ℵ-0 infinite being but which is describable to a ℵ-1 infinite being. In general, there is a Yablo liar for each infinite being but there is no Yablo liar that is indescribable to all infinite beings.
Referential uses of self-referential descriptions
The work of Donnellan (1966) and Kaplan (1989) lets us distinguish between attributive and referential uses of self-referential descriptions. If I set up a sequence with a self-referential description, it does not follow that the content of what I specified is self-referential. "The cat is on the mat" is specified with the descriptive phrase "any sentence that has fewer words than this very sentence" but it is not thereby self-referential. Likewise, I may specify a sequence with a self-referential sentence without the sequence being thereby self-referential. This holds even if my only means of specifying the sequence is self-referential. Reference fixing sentences do not pass their properties (contingency, vagueness, indexicality, etc.) on to the sentences they rigidly designate. The architecture of a description does not mold the structure of what it describes-even if that description is describing other descriptions.
My standards for what counts as a self-referential sequence are not too high. They still provide the right verdicts for the self-referential infinite liar. Priest is committed to saying that the infinite, indirect liar is doubly self-referential-once at the level of specification, again at the level of content. But this just makes it evident that only content self-referentiality is relevant. The other variety is "off the record".
The self-referential infinite liars show that there is nothing finitary in the notion of self-reference. I grant that the reflexive property of infinity sometimes undermines particular liar paradoxes. Think of a finite list with n truths and n-1 falsehoods. Now add to that list a statement that attempts to summarize the number of truths and falsehoods: "This list has an equal number of truths and falsehoods". If the summary is true, there are now n+1 truths and n-1 falsehoods, so the summary would falsely attribute equality. But if the summary is false, it becomes the missing falsehood needed to balance the books. That is, there would be n truths and n falsehoods, making the summary true after all. The summary see-saws between being either a self-fulfilling report or a self-defeating report.
Although the summary is paradoxical for any finite number of propositions, it is unproblematic for transfinite numbers. For example, the summary is true when added to the set of statements of the form "n is an even number". Infinite sets are reflexive: adding a new member does not increase their size. Thus the summary does not interfere with its own measurement of the set's total truths and falsehoods.
A finitist might deny that the indirect infinite liar is a liar paradox just as he denies that Yablo's variation is a liar. However, we should not use the reactions of an ideologue to dictate our classification. A skeptic about modality might deny that "This sentence is possibly false" is a liar paradox. But his opposition should not be the basis of taxonomy.
An antinomy of antinomies
Hardy's distinction between the paradoxes will attract those who closely associate proof and truth. For example, the intuitionist's demand for constructability leads them to condemn proofs with infinitely many premises. This condemnation would have to extend to infinite chains of individually surveyable arguments.
Pseudo-Scotus inspires such a chain with his puzzles about arguments that comment on their own validity (Read 1979) . Here is a parsimonious specimen: 1 = 1, therefore, this argument is invalid. If the conclusion is false, the argument is valid and has a true premise. But then the conclusion is also true. Contradiction. Therefore, we have shown by reductio ad absurdum that the conclusion cannot be false. To put the general point positively, the conclusion follows from the premise. Thus, the argument is valid. Furthermore, the premise is true. Hence, the argument is sound. Yet the conclusion states that the argument is invalid! So the paradox is that the argument is valid if, and only if it is invalid. Now consider an infinite sequence of arguments each contending "1 = 1, therefore, some of the subsequent arguments are invalid." Suppose the premise of argument n is true while the conclusion is false. The falsehood of the conclusion entails that all of the subsequent arguments after n are valid. Consider one of these arguments k. If argument k is valid, then its conclusion is true (since its premise is the truth 1 = 1). Hence, some of the successors of argument k are invalid. Contradiction. This is a reductio ad absurdum refutation of the supposition that the conclusion of argument n is false. Hence, we have a valid proof that the conclusion of n is true. Since the conclusion follows from its premise, argument n is valid. The selection of n was arbitrary, so all the arguments are valid. But wait! If each argu-ment is valid, then each argument has a false conclusion and a true premise. Hence, all of the arguments are also invalid! There are modal versions of the Pseudo-Scotus paradox (Jacquette 1996) . Indeed, I initially "yablofied" the Pseudo-Scotus puzzles by appealing to the principle that a possibly valid argument is necessarily valid. However, Stephen Read has persuaded me that no modal logic is needed to formulate the Pseudo-Scotus paradox or to extend it to the infinitary case. So the previous two paragraphs should be considered a report of Read's improvement.
A general purge of self-reference
There is a wide family of paradoxes that are loosely characterized as selfreferential. The simplicity of Yablo's technique invites the conjecture that all of these paradoxes can be purged of self-reference. The conjecture could be demonstrated if there were a standard formalization of the selfreferential puzzles. For one could then formulate an algorithm that mechanically transforms self-referential puzzles into Yabloesque versions. Unfortunately, there is no standard formalization. The Yablo paradox itself is an anomaly for the most recent attempt (Priest 1995) to unify the phenomena. So I shall resign myself to inductive support. I will show that each member of a representative sample of self-referential puzzles has Yabloesque counterpart, and thereby invite the inference that they all do.
Happily, I do not need to start from scratch. Goldstein (1994) has already formulated a parallel to Russell's paradox about the class of classes that does not contain itself as a member. And the Queue paradox can double as a counterpart to Prior's puzzle and the Sophisticated Preface Paradox.
One can argue more systematically by noting that many self-referential paradoxes easily reduce to the liar (Sorensen 1988, pp. 301-3) . Truth functional operations on the liar provide variations such as the conjunct liar, contingent liars, and so forth. Adding modal notions yields the possible liar and Curry's paradox. Casting the modal liars as arguments yields variations of Pseudo-Scotus's paradoxes of validity. Hence, the Yablo version of the Pseudo-Scotus should not come as a surprise.
Substituting epistemic notions for truth in the liar yields paradoxes such as the knower (K) No one knows that this sentence is true.
If someone knew (K), then (K) would thereby be false. Since knowledge implies truth, it follows that no one knows (K). However, this very argument seems to give us knowledge that (K) is true.
Some solutions to the knower paradox fasten on the element of self-reference. So it is helpful to see a formulation that does not have this element. Consider an infinite sequence composed of tokens of "No one knows that any of the subsequent sentences are true". If someone knows the nth sentence, he would know that sentence n+1 accurately reports that all of its successors are unknown. Thus knowledge of sentence n ensures knowledge of n+1. But knowledge of n+1 would refute sentence n. So the assumption that someone knows n can be refuted by a decisive reductio. But the same reductio gives us knowledge that each member of the series is true! Since knowledge implies truth, one might expect the liar to infect factive propositional attitudes. Burge (1978a) shows that many nonfactive attitudes are also affected by adapting an example of Jean Buridan's: I do not believe this sentence. The puzzle is that I am unable to form a stable opinion about the sentence but others are. They can monitor my beliefs and form a stable opinion about whether I believe it. Now consider an infinite version composed of tokens of "I do not believe any of the subsequent sentences". If I believe sentence n, then I must agree with its successor, n+1, because it accurately reports my nonbelief in the successors of n+1. But if I agree with n+1, I believe it. This refutes sentence n and thus makes it unbelieved after all.
So now suppose that I do not believe sentence n. If this is disbelief, then it amounts to the belief that I believe one of the subsequent sentences. But the earlier argument shows that I cannot believe any member of the series. If the unbelief is neutrality toward sentence n, then that neutrality cannot be generalized. The reason is that if I believe that I have a general policy of neutrality toward members of the Buridan sequence, then I realize that any member I might think of is true. And that amounts to believing that member. And that's already been shown to be impossible.
The mystique of self-reference
Generalization of Yablo's liar trims away the mystique of self-reference. The mystique comes in both emotional valences-self-reference has been romanticized as much as it has been villainized. The general romanticization is evident from the fact that even ordinary people are aware of the liar paradox and from popularizations of self-reference such as Douglas Hof-stadter's inspiring Goedel, Escher, Bach. The romanticization is also evident in mainstream philosophy.
The positive aspect of this tendency is to treat self-reference as a solution. Many mysteries have been "reduced" to self-reference. Philosophers of mind use "self-reference" to pick out an agent's capacity to refer to oneself. Gilbert Ryle traced the "systematic elusiveness" of the self to the incompleteness precipitated by self-reference. Lucas (1961) and more recently, Penrose (1989) , use Gödel's theorem to argue that we differ from machines. Social commentators have noted that "reflexive predictions" influence their own confirmation or disconfirmation (Romanos 1984) . A similar pattern can be discerned in philosophical appeals to quantum mechanics. As Patricia Churchland observed, there is a tendency to reason "Consciousness is mysterious. Quantum mechanics is mysterious. Therefore, consciousness involves quantum mechanics". Churchland could have substituted "self-reference" for "quantum mechanics".
On the other hand, self-reference is frequently demonized. Some philosophers regard any link with self-reference as tainting. For example, Grice initially formulated his analysis of non-natural meaning in terms of a self-referential intention. Later, fearing a liar type paradox, he revised in favour of an analysis featuring an infinite regress of higher order states. Harman (1980, pp. 172-4) criticized this as an unmotivated complication. However, the Yablo variation suggests the stronger criticism that the new (infinite) structure is just as susceptible to the liar paradox. In general, replacing self-reference with infinity does not block the liar paradox.
The Yablo variation also suggests that self-reference is artificially salient. As noted in the psychological literature on causal attribution, heuristic biases lead us to over-attribute causal responsibility to unusual things. When the effect is welcome, the unusual thing is praised. When the effect is undesired, the unusual thing gets blamed. This psychological literature should make us suspect that self-reference is over-sold.
Surprising properties of self-referential statements are too readily inferred as unique to self-reference. Consider Hart's (1970) observation that translators cannot simultaneously preserve self-reference, truth-value and reference.
(H) This sentence is in English. The best German translation of (H) is with another self-referential sentence "Dieser Satz ist auf Deutsch". However, this alters the reference from (H) to the German sentence. One could sacrifice the self-reference by translating (H) as "Dieser Satz ist auf Englisch". Of course, if one let "Dieser Satz ist auf Englisch" be self-referential, then it would have a different truth-value than (H). Hart draws a couple of morals. The first is that the preservation of truth-conditions is not paramount in translation. The second is that reference and truth-value are preserved if and only if selfreference is not preserved.
Burge has suggested that this discovery is "a key to understanding certain intensional contexts in language" (1978b, p. 137) . He argues that it breathes new life into the idea that the sentences used to report beliefs refer to their own language.
However, Burge and Hart are wrong to confine the privilege to self-reference. Translators also face a trilemma between reference, truth value, and Yablo's species of cascading reference. Consider the sequence of tokens of "The subsequent sentences are in English". If one translates each sentence with "Die folgenden Satze sind auf Englisch", the truthvalue of each changes from true to false. If one uses "Die folgenden Satze sind auf Deutsch", truth is preserved but the reference is altered. Nevertheless, if this article were translated into German, the translator would sacrifice reference in order to preserve truth-value.
Self-reference does not enjoy a privileged exception to the translator's practice of preserving meaning. In addition to preserving the structure of Yabloesque referential cascades, translators will preserve circles: (C1) Sentence (C2) is in English, (C2) Sentence (C3) is in English, …, (Cn) Sentence (C1) is in English. Translators will preserve the structure of reference at the expense of content. The examples in books on anaphora are dutifully mimicked with foreign sentences that share the pattern of reference.
A de-mystified attitude toward self-reference yields two benefits. The first is a leveling effect. Once we recognize that other structures have important affinities to self-reference, we are less likely to treat self-reference as a singular, remarkable phenomenon. We are more apt to infer that other structures have its properties and that properties of other structures are possessed by self-reference. The second effect is tolerance. If self-reference is not capable of producing unique effects, the painful consequences cannot be blamed on self-reference. Consequently, draconian policies such as bans on self-reference will no longer be attractive. 
